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Cornell University
Abstract This paper proposes a semantics for free choice permission that explains
both the non-classical behavior of modals and disjunction in sentences used to
grant permission, and their classical behavior under negation. It also explains why
permissions can expire when new information comes in and why free choice arises
even when modals scope under disjunction. On the proposed approach, deontic
modals update preference orderings, and connectives operate on these updates rather
than propositions. The success of this approach stems from its capacity to capture
the difference between expressing the preferences that give rise to permissions and
conveying propositions about those preferences.
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1 Free choice permission and allied phenomena
While I will focus on deontic modals here, free choice effects arise in non-deontic
and even non-modal contexts too (Fox 2007). As I will discuss in §3, once my
analysis is stated it will be possible to articulate structural parallels across this wider
range of data. In this section I will lay out the data to be explained, adding a few
novel observations and examples, and saying why existing analyses are not fully
satisfactory. §2 presents a new dynamic analysis, fully formalized in Appendix A.
1.1 Free choices, hard choices
Using ‘⇒’ and ‘implication’ to neutrally describe inferences that may be semantic
or pragmatic in nature, the basic problem of free choice permission centers on three
implications that I will call Narrow Free Choice, Wide Free Choice and Double
Prohibition. For context, envision a perfectly informed labor representative X telling
her constituents how to vote in an election. If X says (1a), X is intuitively committed
to (1b) (Kamp 1973; von Wright 1968: 4–5).
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Narrow Free Choice (NFC)
May(A∨B)⇒MayA∧MayB
(1) a. Members may vote for Anderson or Brady.
b. Members may vote for Anderson and members may vote for Brady.
Quite curiously, this implication also arises when may scopes under or (Kamp 1978:
273, Zimmermann 2000, Geurts 2005, Simons 2005).
Wide Free Choice (WFC)
MayA∨MayB⇒MayA∧MayB
(2) a. Members may vote for Anderson or you may vote Brady.
b. Members may vote for Anderson and you may vote for Brady.
Neither NFC nor WFC are valid in standard modal logic when may is treated as a
possibility modal and these implications do not meet the standard cancellation test
for implicatures (Simons 2005; Barker 2010). It is not felicitous for X to follow up
her disjunctive permission statement by denying one of the disjuncts.
(3) a. Members may vote for Anderson or Brady.
b. #But members may not vote for { AndersonBrady } .
As is appropriate for a political context, free choice implications can be ‘defeated’
by ignorance (Kamp 1978: 271) or uncooperativeness (Simons 2005: 273).
(4) a. Members may vote for Anderson or Brady, but I don’t know which.
b. # Members may vote for { AndersonBrady } .
(5) a. Members may vote for Anderson or Brady, but I won’t tell you which.
b. # Members may vote for { AndersonBrady } .
This is an important piece of data, but does little to determine whether free choice
is a pragmatic or semantic effect. Some authors have taken it to be a kind of
disambiguation (Simons 2005; Aloni 2007), while others have understood the but
clauses as undercutting premises in a pragmatic inference (e.g., Zimmermann 2000).
The data so far tempt a non-classical semantics for disjunction or modals which
predicts them as entailments. But that makes (1a) and (1b) equivalent, in which
case it is difficult to predict their classical behavior under negation: negating (1a)
intuitively means that both disjuncts are prohibited (Alonso-Ovalle 2006; Fox 2007).
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Double Prohibition (DP)¬May(A∨B)⇒ ¬MayA∧¬MayB
(6) a. Members may not vote for Anderson or Brady.
b. Members may not vote for Anderson and members may not vote for
Brady.
A non-classical approach would seem to incorrectly predict a weak meaning for (6a):¬(MayA∧MayB). But a classical account gives exactly what’s needed: if there’s
not a world where A∨B is true, then there’s not a world where A is true and there’s
not a world where B is true.
This twist seems to favor a pragmatic analysis that treats free choice implications
as implicatures. But articulating an adequate pragmatic analysis has pushed the
frontiers of pragmatics itself. Some theorists have rejected the Gricean axiom that
implicatures are computed globally in terms of the whole utterance. They propose
to treat implicatures locally, arising sub-sententially at the level of clauses, and
postulate unpronounced operators to integrate with this process (e.g., Chierchia
2006; Fox 2007). Franke (2009, 2011) instead suggests that these implicatures are
the result of more interactive, iterated reasoning for which game-theoretic tools
are needed.1 While both of these sophisticated pragmatic approaches treat free
choice effects as scalar implicatures, recent processing (Chemla & Bott 2014) and
acquisition (Tieu, Romoli, Zhou & Crain 2016) studies demonstrate significant
differences between free choice effects and scalar implicatures. This leaves open the
possibility of a yet more subtle pragmatic approach (Tieu et al. 2016). But it also
opens the door for a non-classical semantics that could somehow predict both free
choice effects and DP. I will formulate such a theory in §2, but this alone does not
distinguish that semantic account from others.
Among semantic theories of free choice effects, only Aloni 2007, Barker 2010,
Aher 2012 and Willer 2015 offer some account of DP.2 However, none of these
theories offer compelling accounts of WFC. They all appeal to Simons’s (2005: 281-
2) proposal that across-the-board LF movement can transform (2a) to (1a) at LF.
This would reduce the problem of predicting WFC to that of NFC. But it has not
been observed in the literature that this approach faces a difficult over-generation
1 See van Rooij 2010 for a helpful comparison of this approach with Neo-Gricean and localist ones.
See Schulz 2005 for a more traditional Neo-Gricean account.
2 The accounts of DP in Aloni 2007 and Barker 2010 are not fully satisfying. Aloni 2007: 80 can
predict DP with a particular selection of A∨B’s alternatives, but does not offer a systematic account
of how this selection is made. Barker (2010: §5) treats DP as an implicature, based on uncooperative
or uninformed speakers blocking the implication. But this kind of data would also speak equally
against a semantic explanation of NFC given (4) and (5). The analysis in §2 predicts DP as an
entailment without further assumptions and offers a different account of (4) and (5).
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problem. LF movement is a type-driven process, which makes it hard and ad hoc
to limit it to particular modals and connectives of the same type. Yet, (7a) does not
have a reading on which it means (7b).
(7) a. Members may vote for Anderson and members may vote for Brady.
b. # Members may vote for Anderson and Brady.
MayA∧MayB doesn’t transform to May(A∧B), despite being formally parallel to
the alleged transformation of MayA∨MayB into May(A∨B). It is also worth noting
that none of the existing pragmatic accounts explain WFC either (van Rooij 2010:
24). The analysis proposed in §2 will semantically predict WFC without appeal to
movement. In developing that analysis, I will first look to allied phenomena which
reveal free choice as part of a broader pattern of resource sensitivity.
1.2 Resource sensitivity and strong permission
Simons 2005 and Barker 2010 also stress the non-implications in (8), noting that
when the disjuncts are not contextually exclusive — suppose Anderson and Brady
are in a runoff election where members get to vote for two candidates — it cannot
be inferred that one may not choose both disjuncts. Barker 2010 diagnoses this
as an effect of permission being a discrete resource and embraces a non-classical
logic to suit. On this theme I highlight (9), which shows that a hearer can’t assume
permission persists after one option has been chosen (Asher & Bonevac 2005: 304).
Resource Sensitivity (RS)
1. May(A∨B)⇏May(A∧B)
2. May(A∨B)⇏ ¬May(A∧B)
3. May(A1∨A2),Ai⇏MayAj; i, j ∈ {1,2}
(8) a. You may vote for Anderson or Brady.
b. #You may vote for both Anderson and Brady.
c. #You may not vote for both Anderson and Brady.
(9) a. You may vote for Anderson or Brady.
b. You did vote for Anderson.
c. #You may (still) vote for Brady.
While RS1 and RS2 are non-entailments in standard modal logic, the conclusions
follow as implicatures on most pragmatic approaches — see Barker 2010: §6.1.
Similarly for RS3, which is predicted by standard modal logic but the conclusion
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still follows as an implicature on most pragmatic approaches. Semantic analyses
like Barker 2010 and Aloni 2007 also fail to predict RS3.3
Resource sensitivity appears to go even deeper, preventing an inference from
Mayφ to Mayψ even when φ entails ψ . This is clear with disjunction, where You
may vote for Anderson or Brady does not follow from You may vote for Anderson.
Many semantic theories predict this, but rely crucially on the semantics of disjunction
to do so. However an example from Starr 2016b: §2.3 suggests this phenomenon is
more general. Arnie, a mobster, enlists his ruthless minion Monica to interrogate
a known snitch, Jimmy. Arnie doesn’t care for serious torture, so he’s developed
another method. He will have Monica inject Jimmy with both a deadly poison and
its antidote. When the two solutions are administered simultaneously they produce
only minor cramps and shortness of breath. Monica is to tell Jimmy that he will be
administered the antidote if he confesses and informs on other snitches, relying on
the minor symptoms to persuade. Here, (10b) does not intuitively follow from (10a).
(10) a. Monica may inject Jimmy with poison and antidote.
b. #Monica may inject Jimmy with poison.
Indeed, Arnie may call Monica en route to clarify — perhaps knowing she would
love to give Jimmy just the poison and see him die — to say (11).
(11) You may not inject Jimmy with poison. Inject him with the solution of
poison and antidote.
So we have a failure of the inference from May(P∧A) to MayP and from ¬MayA
to ¬May(P∧A). While permission has been granted for P∧A, that resource cannot
be used to generate permission for a related, but more general resource: P.
This line of investigation leads us back to the very passage where von Wright
1968: 4–5 first observed the puzzle of free choice permission. It is claimed there that
the kind of permission that gives rise to free choice is strong permission. Suppose I
say You may eat apples and say You may not eat bananas. Bananas are forbidden,
apples are not forbidden, but cherries also aren’t forbidden. This distinction between
the status of apples and cherries is exactly the distinction between strong and weak
permission. As Barker 2010: §3 highlights, this is crucial to capturing RS1 and
RS2. By RS2, May(A∨B) does not forbid A∧B. But by RS1, it also doesn’t entail
May(A∧B). So may here must express strong permission. Note that this context
does not support You may eat cherries, but it does support (12a) and (12b).
3 Fusco 2015 and Asher & Bonevac 2005 are the only semantic analyses I know of which capture RS3.
Unfortunately, neither captures WFC or DP, which are my primary focus in this paper. However
Fusco (p.c.) informs me that her system affords a different semantics of negation that captures DP.
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Resource Sensitivity (RS) Cont.
4. May(A1∧A2)⇏MayAi; i ∈ {1,2}
5. ¬¬Mayφ ⇏Mayφ
6. ¬Must¬φ ⇏Mayφ
(12) a. It’s not the case that you may not eat cherries.
b. It’s not the case that you must not eat cherries.
If this is right, then the logic of may follows RS5 and the logic of must follows
RS6. The failure of duality in RS6 is old news.4 But the failure of double-negation
elimination in modal contexts has not been observed. It requires not just a non-
classical semantics for modals, but a non-classical semantics for negation.5
Weak permission is naturally suited to classical modal logic. If a set of worlds
R models what’s required, any proposition classically consistent with R is weakly
permitted. To capture RS one must abandon an analysis of permission as weak
permission, and classical logic with it. But this makes it harder, not easier, to capture
the classical pattern of DP. RS6 shows the need for a non-classical semantics of
negation and this suggests a way forward. In the following section I will distinguish
requirements and strong permission dynamically: they involve different ways of
expressing preferences. Crucially, expressing preferences will not be equated with
eliminating worlds where certain preferences are held. Instead, it will be analyzed as
directly modifying a preference relation. Negation will then have two functions, one
when it modifies a sentence that eliminates worlds — an informational, descriptive
sentence — and one when it modifies preferences. Surprisingly, it is possible to do
this without lexical ambiguity. This semantics of negation, when combined with a
particular dynamic account of disjunction and strong permission, will capture all of
the patterns discussed in this section.
2 Expressing permission, dynamically
The analysis developed in this section is motivated by a simple idea: expressing
permission involves incrementally building a partial map of what can be done,
rather than describing what the fully precise permission facts in some world are.
Articulating this idea requires making precise this contrast between incremental,
partial expression of permission and describing precise permission facts that hold in
a world. I will do this by first presenting in §2.1 the simple model of informational
dynamics from Veltman 1996, and then contrasting it in §2.2 with the model of de-
ontic dynamics proposed here. Section 2.3 will use this model to sketch a semantics
4 von Wright (1968: 4–5). More recently: Kratzer 1981: §4, McNamara 2010 and Cariani 2013: §5.
5 I thank Malte Willer for encouraging me to think about double-negation.
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and logic for may that captures free choice effects. Negation and DP are treated in
§2.4. Section 2.5 uses these tools to explain RS1–6 and §2.6 returns to the issue of
how ignorance and uncooperativeness can defeat free choice effects.
2.1 Information dynamics
The dynamics of information is simple. Information says the world is some of these
ways, and none of those. This is captured by taking a state of information s to be a
set of worlds. If one assumes a sentence’s only job is to provide information about
the world, then a sentence φ ’s meaning [φ] can be thought of as a function from
one state of information s to another s′. In Veltman’s (1996) terminology, s[φ] is the
result of updating s with φ . On this dynamic approach, an atomic sentence A serves
to eliminate worlds from s where A is false. ¬φ removes worlds that would survive
AB
aB
Ab
ab
[A]Ð→ AB
aB
Ab
ab
{wAB,wAb,waB,wab} {wAB,wAb}
Figure 1 Atomic Update (Uppercase = True, Lowercase = False)
an update with φ , while φ ∧ψ sequences the effects of its conjuncts. φ ∨ψ unions
the effects of its conjuncts. More formally:
Informational Update Semantics (Veltman 1996)
1. s[A] = {w ∈ s ∣w(A) = 1} 3. s[φ ∧ψ] = (s[φ])[ψ]
2. s[¬φ] = s− s[φ] 4. s[φ ∨ψ] = s[φ]∪ s[ψ]
Adding deontic modals to this framework presents a choice: do deontic modals
provide information about the world, and so update s, or do they have a different
kind of effect entirely? The traditional approach in modal logic has been to assume
that deontic modals provide information about the world. 3φ eliminates any world
w relative to which there is not an accessible φ -world. On this analysis 3φ provides
information about the world, namely which worlds are accessible from our world.
Veltman 1996 offers a slightly different approach to Mightφ , where it does not
point-wise eliminate worlds based on their properties, but places a global test on the
information state itself. The result of the test is s or ∅.
Test Semantics for Might s[Mightφ] = {w ∈ s ∣ s[φ] ≠∅}
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I will explore an even further departure from the classical semantics. Deontic
modals don’t describe worlds or even test information states, they test and update
what I will call a deontic frame pi . A deontic frame will be modeled using preference
relations between worlds. After all, like preferences, deontic modals serve to
motivate agents to do things. On a traditional descriptive semantics the best one
can do to capture this connection between motivation and deontic modals is to have
deontic propositions describe the preferences that hold in a world e.g., MayA is true
in w if the most preferred worlds in w are consistent with A. The account developed
here will allow one to model language which directly influences preferences, without
recourse to propositions that passively describe those preferences.6
2.2 Deontic dynamics
Following Kamp (1973, 1978), Lewis (1979) and van Rooij (2000), I will analyze
Mayφ dynamically in terms of how it updates requirements/permissions pi , rather
than information s (a set of worlds). But the dynamic analysis I will propose has
two key differences. One difference will be discussed later in §2.3. The difference I
will focus on here is that pi distinguishes weak permission and strong permission
by having two separate ‘preference frames’ for what’s required and what’s strongly
permitted — the motivation for modeling preference frames in terms of a strict
preference ordering and an indifference ordering is discussed further in Appendix
A, Remark 1. The basic idea is that making requirements and providing permissions
both involve presenting preferences, just in different ways.
Practical Frames
pi ∶= ⟨Rpi ,Ppi⟩ consists of requirements Rpi and strong permissions Ppi
1. Requirement Frame: Rpi ∶= ⟨rpi ,∼pi⟩
• rpi(w1,w2): w1 is strictly preferable to w2
• w1 ∼pi w2: w1 is just as preferable as w2
2. Permission Frame: Ppi ∶= ⟨ppi ,≈pi⟩ same as Rpi .
This is best illustrated by considering the indifferent practical frame I, depicted
in Figure 2. The graph on the left represents the requirements, and that on the right
the permissions. Wavy lines depict the indifference relation, while straight lines will
be used for strict preferences (reflexive wavy lines are omitted in all diagrams for
readability). This simple practical frame distinguishes weak and strong permission.
6 For more on the philosophical motivations of this approach see Starr 2016a.
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AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI PI⟨∅,W 2⟩ ⟨∅,∅⟩
I
Figure 2 Indifferent Practical Frame: no requirements, no strong permissions
The requirements RI are completely indifferent about which world is realized, so
everything is weakly permitted. Yet, nothing is strongly permitted since PI does
not promote any worlds as better, or even equally good as, any other. As discourse
unfolds, strict preferences are introduced to RI and PI, and indifference fills in
between worlds that are not strictly preferred to one another. Figure 3 depicts this
process by first introducing a requirement and then introducing a permission.
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
ALRIM ALRIM
ReqA(I)
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
ALRIM BLALRIMM
PerB(ReqA(I))
Figure 3 Making A Required, Then B Permitted
First, A is made to be required in I — ReqA(I) — which involves making A-
worlds preferred in both RI and PI — the notation of AL ⋅M is used for this operation.
This just means that introducing an explicit requirement entails strong permission.
Next, to make B permitted in the resulting state, one creates a permission ordering
from the requirement ordering. This is done by adding a preference for B-worlds
to the existing preferences. There are two crucial things to note here. First, only
a preference for the top-ranked B-world is introduced. When a permission is in-
troduced, it must be integrated with the existing requirements. Permission to do B,
after A has been required, can only be permission to do A∧B. Second, this process
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would appear to overwrite any prior permissions. How would one capture two
distinct strong permissions to do A and ¬A? This issue, along with the interaction of
permission and information, requires augmenting the basic model of requirements
and permissions sketched here.
2.3 Semantics and logic
Integrating information and deontic frames seems simple enough: let sentences
update ⟨s,pi⟩. But there is another crucial twist here that differentiates this analysis
from others. Sentences will update a set of such pairs, as there can be many pi’s and
s’s at play in discourse:
States S is a set of substates: S = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn }
• Each substate spi consists of an information state s and a practical
frame pi: spi ∶= ⟨s,pi⟩.
The initial state 0 has a single substate with the set of all worldsW as its information
state, and I as its practical frame: 0 ∶=W I. In a state S where there are multiple
substates each spi ∈ S is competing for control over the agent’s actions and beliefs.
This is not to say that agents are uncertain about which unique spi obtains, or that the
discourse leaves a particular spi underdetermined. Instead, the agents are allowing a
range of spi to remain in play to explore a wider range of options without needing
to decide between them. As it turns out, the use of states rather than just substates
provides a crucial resource for analyzing permission and disjunction.
MayA and May¬A are intuitively consistent, but there is no single coherent Ppi
which both ranks A-worlds over ¬A-worlds and ranks ¬A-worlds over A-worlds.
Substates solve this problem by allowing MayA to create a new substate where there
is strong permission for A, but also leave prior substates intact. On reflection, this
makes sense: granting permission to do A allows the hearer to act in accord with a
background pi where A may not be preferred, but it also allows the hearer to act in
accord with an ordering just like pi except a permissive preference for A has been
added — call it PerA(pi). So a successful update of 0 with MayA will contain two
substates, one with I as its practical frame, and one with PerA(I) as its practical
frame. This is depicted in Figure 4 using the same basic conventions as before,
only now the worlds pictured are from the relevant information state, boxes delimit
substates and a bold box delimits the whole state.
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AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI PI
W I
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI ALRIM
WPerA(I)
Figure 4 0[MayA]
This semantics for may can be stated as the following recipe.
Semantics for May
S[MayA]: Is A is weakly permitted by all pi? If yes do (a), if no do (b).
a. Add strong permission for A to each pi , put each augmented pi , PerA(pi),
in play was well as each original pi .
– Map S = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn } to S′ = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn ,sPerA(pi1)1 , . . . ,sPerA(pin)n }
b. Reduce each s to ∅: {∅pi1, . . . ,∅pin}
(See Appendix A, Definition 9 for full formalization)
As discussed above, PerA(pi) simply overwrites Ppi with ALRpiM i.e., it creates a new
permissive ordering from pi’s requirements with an added preference for A-worlds.
This statement of the semantics and Figure 4 make clear a crucial feature of the
analysis: MayA creates substates. This is crucial because disjunction also creates
substates, predicting a special connection between the two.
The semantics for conjunction and disjunction is unchanged from above.
Connective Semantics 1. S[φ ∧ψ] = (S[φ])[ψ]; 2. S[φ ∨ψ] = S[φ]∪S[ψ]
But this semantics now predicts that disjunctions will create substates. For example,
0[A∨B] will return {{wAB,wAb}I,{wAB,waB}I}. The fact that disjunction creates
substates interacts in an important way with the semantics for May . Updating 0 with
MayA∨MayB will result in a state just like 0[MayA] in Figure 4, except there will
another substate WPerB(I) where B-worlds are preferred. More generally:
{spi11 , . . . ,spinn }[MayA∨MayB]={spi11 , . . . ,spinn ,sPerA(pi1)1 , . . . ,sPerA(pin)n ,sPerB(pi1)1 , . . . ,sPerB(pin)n }
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AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI PI
W I
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI ALRIM
WPerA(I)
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI BLRIM
WPerB(I)
Figure 5 0[MayA∨MayB]
As Figure 5 shows, subsequently updating this state with either MayA or MayB
will have no effect. MayA always leaves incoming substates in the output state, so it
could only add substates. But MayA adds substates by overwriting their permissions.
This means it will turn each spiii ∈ {spi11 , . . . ,spinn }[MayA∨MayB] into sPerA(pii)i . Since
each of those is in {spi11 , . . . ,spinn }[MayA∨MayB] already, updating with MayA after
updating with MayA∨MayB will not produce any change to the deontic frames.
This is precisely what is required for practical consequence and for predicting WFC.
S p-supports φ when it doesn’t change any of the pi’s at play in S, and p-consequence
is just p-support in any state that has been updated with the premises.
P-Support S⊫ φ : S⊫ φ ⇐⇒ ∏S =∏S[φ], where ∏S ∶= {pi ∣ spi ∈ S & s ≠∅}
P-Consequence φ1, . . . ,φn⊫ψ ⇐⇒ ∀S∶ S[φ1]⋯[φn]⊫ψ
This much explains WFC. Predicting NFC hinges on further details.
As noted above, A∨B creates a substate for each disjunct. In this sense, φ ’s
dynamic meaning determines its alternatives in S:
Alternatives altS(φ) ∶= {a ∣ ∃pi ∶ api ∈ S[φ]}
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As in Simons 2005 and Aloni 2007, one can formulate the semantics of Mayφ so
will operate on each of φ ’s alternatives: Mayφ takes each a ∈ alts(φ) and each input
pi , and tests whether a is consistent with what’s required by pi . If so, a substate
featuring Pera(pi) is added to S — see Definition 9 in Appendix A. This predicts
that S[May(A∨B)] = S[MayA∨MayB]. So NFC is valid, just as WFC is. It is
worth noting that S[May(A∨B)] does not in general support May(A∧B) (RS1).
Conjunctive permission would add a substate where only wAB is strictly preferred to
every other world. To predict the other RS patterns and DP, one must formulate a
semantics of negation which not only operates on information, but also preferences.
2.4 Negation and double prohibition
¬φ will remove worlds that would survive an update with φ , as in the semantics
for negation from §2.1. But, it also removes preferences that would result from an
update with φ — see Definition 15, Appendix A.
Negation S[¬φ]:
1. Remove information that would survive update with φ
2. Retract φ preferences from each pi , (notation: pi updownharpoonrightleft φ )
a. Remove strict permissive preferences that φ would add to 0, reverse
them and make them both requirement and permissive preferences
b. Remove strict requirement preferences that φ would add to 0
c. If a strict preference relating w and w′ was removed and not re-
versed, introduce indifference between w and w′
The various clauses are best explained with two kinds of examples. One where S
p-supports ¬MayA, one where S does not p-support ¬MayA.
To find a state that supports ¬MayA one first has to find a state where A is
inconsistent with what’s required. By Clause 1, the test with MayA needs to fail,
or else the information of the state will be reduced to ∅. Figure 6 depicts Rpi1 in S1,
which is an example of a state where the test imposed by MayA will fail. But, to
support ¬MayA, S1 must also already contain the preferences ¬MayA would add,
and lack the preferences it would remove. In particular, Clause 2a tells us that the
state must not have a preference for A-worlds over ¬A-worlds in Ppi , and the state
must have ¬A-worlds preferred to A-worlds in Ppi and Rpi . (Clause 2b doesn’t apply
here, as MayA does not change the requirements.) Clause 2c ensures that any worlds
that are not related by strict preference are related by indifference.
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AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
Rpi1 Ppi1
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
Rpi1updownharpoonrightleftMay(A∨B) Ppi1updownharpoonrightleftMay(A∨B)
S1 S1[¬May(A∨B)]
Figure 6 S1⊫ ¬MayA and S1⊯ ¬May(A∨B)
State S1 p-supports ¬MayA, but it does not p-support ¬May(A∨B). When one
retracts May(A∨B) from pi1, one must reverse any strict permissive preference that
exists in 0[May(A∨B)]. This means one must reverse all the preferences in ALPIM
and in BLPIM, and put them together into both Rpi and Ppi of one practical frame pi .
Looking back at Figure 5, it should be clear that the result is the state depicted on
the right in Figure 6. Here, wab is the only rational choice. This makes clear that¬May(A∨B) does not have a weak reading akin to ¬MayA∨¬MayB, despite the
fact that the semantics validates WFC and NFC. Figure 6 tells one enough to see
how DP ends up valid. S1[¬May(A∨B)] is the minimal state that would p-support¬May(A∨B). Indeed, the same state would have resulted from 0[¬May(A∨B)].
As discussed, S1 p-supports ¬MayA but as the graphs make clear, all of the effects
produced by ¬MayA are already in place in S1[¬May(A∨B)]. The same goes for¬MayB. In sum, this semantics somewhat miraculously makes May(A∨B) behave
non-classically when unembedded, but classically when embedded under negation.
The key was a semantics for negation which operates not just on information, but
on practical frames as well. This semantics for negation may look complex. But,
conceptually, it is a simple and familiar idea: ¬φ works by removing structures that
would persist in a hypothetical update with φ .
2.5 Resource sensitivity
Resource Sensitivity (RS)
1. May(A∨B)⇏May(A∧B)
2. May(A∨B)⇏ ¬May(A∧B)
3. May(A1∨A2),Ai⇏MayAj; i, j ∈ {1,2}
4. May(A1∧A2)⇏MayAi; i ∈ {1,2}
5. ¬¬Mayφ ⇏Mayφ
6. ¬Must¬φ ⇏Mayφ
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Of the above, only RS1 has been explained. But when the semantics for negation
is considered alongside Figure 5, it should be fairly clear how RS2 is predicted.
Updating 0[MayA∨MayB] with ¬May(A∧B) would remove the preference for
wAB over wab in both ALRIM and BLRIM. So it cannot be that ¬May(A∧B) is a
p-consequence of MayA∨MayB. While on the topic of negation, RS5 and RS6
deserve attention.
The failures of double-negation elimination behind RS5 are very specific, as
suggested by the natural language data considered in §1.2. They are exactly in
those states where there is a difference between what’s weakly permitted and what’s
strongly permitted. 0 is just such as state. Consider 0[¬¬MayA]. This will remove
from 0 the permissive and requirement preferences that ¬MayA would add to 0.
Looking back at Figure 6, these will be any strict preferences for ¬A-worlds. There
are no such preferences in 0, so 0⊫ ¬¬MayA. But clearly 0⊯MayA, since MayA
adds strong permission for A. It is worth noting that in states like S1 from Figure
6 this mismatch between weak and strong permission does not hold, and those
contexts do not provide counterexamples to double-negation. It is therefore possible
to formally specify a restricted version of double-negation, should one want to
explain why it often sounds like a good inference.
Basically the same reasoning is behind RS6, although this requires specifying
a semantics for must. Here I adopt the semantics developed in Starr 2016a — see
Definition 13 in Appendix A. Mayφ tests whether φ is consistent with the worlds
best according to each input Rpi . If so, preferences for the best φ -worlds are added
to each Rpi and Ppi . If not, each substate is reduced to ∅pi . In 0, ¬Must¬A will idle
since 0 has no preferences to remove in the first place. But MayA will clearly change
0: it will add strong permission for A. As with RS5, this is a limited failure of the
classical pattern. It is only in very specific kinds of states that it will fail.
To see how RS3 is predicted, consider updating 0[MayA∨MayB] from Fig-
ure 5 with B. This simply trims out the ¬B-worlds, depicted below in Figure 7.7
Subsequently updating with MayA would not change this particular state, since
it would turn all input practical frames into ALRIM, and union them back into the
state above. ALRIM is already there. However, recall from §1.2 that in the nat-
ural language examples used to support RS3, wAB was prohibited. In the state
0[MayA∨MayB][¬May(A∧B)][B], only BPerB(I) and BI will persist. But when
MayA transforms them into ALRIM and unions it back into the state, a change occurs.
RS4 follows from the fact that May(A∧B) will prefer wAB to every world, and
will not prefer wAb to wab. Since MayA will add a substate where wAb is preferred
to wab, it cannot be a p-consequence of May(A∧B).
7 It is worth clarifying that B does not change the orderings, only the space of worlds. However, may
and must are only concerned with cS, so one can pretend as if they do. This difference will matter if
the system is extended to deontics like should and ought which range over a wider class of worlds.
339
Starr
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI PI
BI
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI ALRIM
BPerA(I)
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
RI BLRIM
BPerB(I)
Figure 7 0[MayA∨MayB][B]
2.6 Coping with the ignorant and rude
Ignorance, as in (4), and uncooperativity, as in (5), cancel free choice effects.
(4) a. Members may vote for Anderson or Brady, but I don’t know which.
b. # Members may vote for { AndersonBrady } .
(5) a. Members may vote for Anderson or Brady, but I won’t tell you which.
b. # Members may vote for { AndersonBrady } .
On the analysis above, MayA∨MayA and May(A∨B) are equivalent. So (4) and
(5) cannot involve disambiguating between narrow and wide-scope readings of
the modal. Instead, I propose that both (4) and (5) cancel free choice effects by
introducing uncertainty about which of two states to adopt.
Recall that if spi11 , . . . ,s
pin
n ∈ S, then:
S[May(A∨B)] = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn ,sALpi1M1 , . . . ,sALpinMn ,sBLpi1M1 , . . . ,sBLpinMn }
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Both (4) and (5) result in higher-order uncertainty over which of two states should be
adopted: SA = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn ,sALpi1M1 , . . . ,sALpinMn } or SB = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn ,sBLpi1M1 , . . . ,sBLpinMn }.
Adapting the supervaluationist ideas of Van Fraassen 1966 and Stalnaker 1981, a
sentence is supported despite such uncertainty only if it is supported by all resolutions
of that uncertainty. Since only one resolution p-supports MayA — SA — and only
one p-supports MayB — SB — neither permission claim is supported. This also
clarifies the importance of interpreting substates as competing for control over actions
and beliefs rather than uncertainty about what state one is in. Uncertainty involves
deliberation and a forced choice between two or more options, while the former
allows the agents to leave this choice unmade. But how exactly does higher-order
uncertainty arise from the compositional semantics of (4) and (5)?
Consider first some fully explicit versions of the but-phrases.
(13) I don’t know which of the two candidates you may vote for.
(14) I won’t tell you which of the two candidates you may vote for.
Both of them convey, whether by presupposition, assertion or implicature, that one,
and only one, of the two candidates may be voted for. Additionally, (13) asserts that
the speaker is uncertain whether they should be in a state of mind represented by SA
or one represented by SB. So (13)’s total contribution is that the speaker is uncertain
about whether to adopt a state of mind represented by SA or one represented by
SB, and that only one of these representations is correct. On the assumption that
the speaker is more authoritative than the hearer about permissions, it follows that
the state representing the hearer’s state of mind should follow suit. That is, they
should also be uncertain about which of the two states to adopt, and require a choice
between them. The assertion of (14) is certainly different, as it entails that the
speaker’s state of mind is definitely represented by either SA or by SB. (14)’s total
impact combines this with the information that only one state is correct. Here’s how.
Given the speaker’s authority, the hearer should bring their state of mind to match
the speaker’s. As a result they are forced to choose between adopting SA and SB,
but uncertain which one to choose. Combined with reasonable assumptions, this is
enough to predict how free choice effects are blocked in (4) and (5).
It is plausible to assume that the elliptical but-phrases in (4) and (5) mean
something like (13) and (14), respectively. It is also plausible to assume that but
is a species of conjunction, and so sequentially updates the state. This means
that the first conjuncts of (4) and (5) will license free choice inferences, but once
the state is further updated by the second conjunct and its pragmatic implications
inferred, the conversation enters a state that no longer licenses those free choice
inferences. This kind of non-monotonicity was also key to explaining RS3 where
additional information blocked a free choice inference. It is only possible to give
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this kind of analysis of ignorance and uncooperativity because the semantics builds
non-monotonicity into the account of permission. While a more complete formal
implementation of this analysis is needed, the sketch above shows that it will likely
work out in a motivated and plausible way.
3 Conclusion
The semantics presented here covers more of the permission data in a more com-
pelling way than the competing semantic analyses discussed in §1.1. The insight
driving this semantics is that permission statements express incremental changes
directly to preferences rather than describing fully precise permission facts. But I
have said nothing about free choice effects that arise in contexts where permission
is not involved, and it is not plausible to say that preferences are being expressed
rather than described there. For example, it is well-known that in epistemic contexts
might and disjunction lead to free choice effects, and similarly for disjunctions in the
antecedents of conditionals. Further, Klinedinst 2006, Eckardt 2007 and Fox 2007
observe that existential quantifiers with non-plural restrictors produce free choice
inferences when they interact with disjunction.
(15) a. There is beer in the fridge or the ice-bucket.
b. ⇒ There is beer in the fridge.
c. ⇒ There is beer in the ice-bucket.
Much further work is needed to say whether all of these other free choice effects
also give rise to the kinds of resource sensitive reasoning detailed in §1.2. But even
at this preliminary stage, it is crucial to clarify that the general style of semantics
given here is not applicable only to the particulars of preferences and permission.
The crucial feature of the semantics is that it avoids fully precise descriptions of
a particular semantic object — e.g., modal orderings — by instead incrementally
building a partial map of that domain which exploits the way language users mentally
represent that domain. Permission draws on preferences, which are incrementally
constructed in a way that is sensitive to how humans represent them. The same kind
of model for representing uncertainty and counterfactuals already exists (Sloman
2005; Pearl 2009). Work on quantifiers, pluralities and discourse reference in
dynamic semantics suggests similar resources for that phenomenon (van den Berg
1996; Nouwen 2003; Brasoveanu 2008). These approaches motivate rethinking
our semantics of logical connectives in terms of how they incrementally modify
partial representations of a domain. While it will not be possible to explore these
connections here, there are enough structural parallels to make this a worthwhile
direction for future research.
342
Expressing permission
A Expressive deontic logic (EDL)
Definition 1 (Syntax)
1. Wff0 ∶∶= At ∣ (¬Wff0) ∣ (Wff0∨Wff0) ∣ (Wff0∧Wff0)
2. Wff ∶∶=Wff0 ∣ (MayWff0) ∣ (MustWff0) ∣ (¬Wff) ∣ (Wff∨Wff) ∣ (Wff∧Wff)
Definition 2 (Worlds W , Information States s) W ∶ At↦ {0,1}; s ⊆W
Definition 3 (Practical Frames pi)
pi ∶= ⟨Rpi ,Ppi⟩, where Rpi are requirements and Ppi are strong permissions
1. Rpi ∶= ⟨rpi ,∼pi⟩
• rpi(w,w′): ‘w is strictly preferable to w′’
• w ∼pi w′: ‘w is just as preferable as w′’
• w ≁pi w′ iff rpi(w,w′) and w ≠w′
2. Ppi ∶= ⟨ppi ,≈pi⟩; interpretation parallel to Rpi
Remark 1 The need for both rpi and ∼pi comes from wanting to distinguish an agent
who has irrational strict preferences i.e., rpi = {⟨w1,w2⟩,⟨w2,w1⟩}, from an agent who
takes w1 and w2 to be just as preferable. The former state of preference is expressed
by MustA∧Must¬A while the latter would support ¬MustA but neither MustA
nor Must¬A. Capturing these differences is essential to developing a thoroughly
non-representational approach to deontic modality (Starr 2016a).
Definition 4 (Indifferent Practical Frame) I ∶= ⟨⟨∅,W 2⟩,⟨∅,∅⟩⟩
Definition 5 (States S, Substates spi )
1. A state S is a set of substates: S = {spi11 , . . . ,spinn }
2. A substate spi is an information state s and a practical frame pi: spi ∶= ⟨s,pi⟩
Definition 6 (Initial State) 0 ∶= {W I} i.e., no information, practically indifferent
Definition 7 (Conjunction, Disjunction)
1. S[φ ∧ψ] = (S[φ])[ψ]
2. S[φ ∨ψ] = S[φ]∪S[ψ]
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Definition 8 (Choice)
Chs(Rpi) ∶= {w1 ∈ s ∣ ∄w2 ∈ s∶ rpi(w2,w1) & ∃w2 ∈ s∶w1 ∼pi w2 or rpi(w1,w2)}
Remark 2 Choice worlds are not dispreferred to any world and are either preferred
to or just as preferable as at least one world. This second clause is necessary to ensure
that a completely empty ordering does not make everything choosable. Intuitively, if
you have absolutely no preferences no choice is good because none of them have
anything going for them. This is relevant when considering ChW (PI) which should
be ∅ rather than W . This captures the fact that everything is weakly permitted in I
but nothing is strongly permitted.
Definition 9 (May)
S[Mayφ] = { Perφ(S) if ∀spi ∈ S,∀a ∈ altS(φ)∶Chs(Rpi)∩a ≠∅{∅pi ∣ spi ∈ S} otherwise
Remark 3 Mayφ performs a test and then shifts the state depending on its outcome.
It tests that for every substate and each of φ ’s alternatives a, the Choice worlds in that
substate are consistent with a. In other words, it tests that each of φ ’s alternatives is
weakly permitted in S. If the test is failed, each substate’s information is reduced
to ∅. If the test is passed, φ becomes strongly permitted: Perφ(S). This is done
in two steps. First, one creates a new pi for each of φ ’s alternatives a, notated
Pera(pi). As Definition 11.2 below states, this involves copying pi’s requirements
into the permission slot of pi , and making a preferred in this new permission ordering.
Definition 12 says that this is done by strictly preferring each a world in s over each
non-a world and making sure that a and non-a worlds are not equally preferable.
Second, one takes all such sPera(pi) and unions them together with S (Definition
11.1). This reflects the fact that permissions are not combined, but allowed to ‘live
alongside’ one another. After all, Mayφ and May¬φ are consistent.
Remark 4 It is reasonable to wonder why substates and alternatives are universally
quantified over in Definition 13. The universal quantification over substates predicts
that Ella is in her study or the parlor, you may not disturb her can be supported by
a state where visiting Ella is only problematic if she is in her study. The universal
quantification over alternatives is required to make sure that May(A∨B) requires
both A and B to be weakly permitted.
Remark 5 This semantics has May influencing both pi , when the test is success-
ful, and s when the test fails. This behavior is important when Mayφ is negated.
As Definition 15 details, ¬ψ eliminates preferences that ψ would add (reversing
permissive preferences and making them requirements), and information ψ would
add. So when the test imposed by Mayφ fails, ¬Mayφ will have no effect on the
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information, since it takes s−∅. But it will still have an effect on the preferences: it
takes permissive preferences for φ -worlds over ¬φ -worlds, reverses them and adds
them to the requirements. This correctly predicts that Must¬φ will be a practical
consequence of ¬Mayφ . This operation also predicts DP. ¬May(A∨B) will end up
adding to the requirements a preference for ¬A-worlds over A-worlds and ¬B-worlds
over B-worlds, since it reverses each of the permissive preferences that May(A∨B)
would add and adds the inverse of this preference to all substates. The resulting state
will therefore support both ¬MayA and ¬MayB.
Definition 10 (Alternatives for φ given S) altS(φ) ∶= {a ∣ ∃pi ∶ api ∈ S[φ]}
Definition 11 (Permitting φ in S, a in pi)
1. Perφ(S) ∶= S∪{sPera(pi) ∣ spi ∈ S & a ∈ alts(φ)}
2. Pera(pi) ∶= ⟨Rpi ,aLRpiM⟩
Definition 12 (Preferring a in Rpi /Ppi )
1. aLRpiM ∶= ⟨aLrpiM,aL∼rpi M⟩
2. aLrpiM ∶= rpi ∪{⟨w,w′⟩ ∈ s2 ∣w ∈Chs(Rpi)∩a & w′ ∉Chs(Rpi)∩a}
3. aL∼rpi M ∶= s2−aLrpiM2
Definition 13 (Must)
S[Must(φ)] = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
Reqφ(S) if ∀spi ∈ Reqφ(S),∀a ∈ altS(φ)∶Chs(Rpi) ⊆ a{∅pi ∣ spi ∈ S} otherwise
Remark 6 Mustφ first performs a shift — the if -clause of Definition 13 quantifies
over spi ∈ Reqφ(S) rather than spi ∈ S — and then performs a test on this shifted state.
It shifts to a state where φ is required, and tests that for every substate, all of φ ’s
alternatives are entailed by the Choice worlds in that substate. If the test is failed,
each substate’s information is reduced to ∅. If the test is passed, φ becomes required
by making each of its alternatives preferred in Rpi and Ppi (Definition 14).
Definition 14 (Requiring φ in S, a in pi)
1. Reqφ(S) ∶= {sReqa(pi) ∣ spi ∈ S & a ∈ altS(φ)}
2. Reqa(pi) ∶= ⟨aLRpiM,aLPpiM⟩
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Definition 15 (Negation) Reading spiii − s j as (si− s j)pii:
S[¬φ] = {spiupdownharpoonrightleftφ −⋃alt{spi}(φ) ∣ spi ∈ S}
1. pi updownharpoonrightleft φ ∶= ⟨Rpi ↾φ ,Ppi ⇃φ⟩
a. Rpi ↾φ ∶= ⟨(rpi−r(φ))∪p(φ)−1,(∼pi∪r(φ)∪r(φ)−1)−(p(φ)∪p(φ)−1)⟩
b. Ppi ⇃φ ∶= ⟨(ppi − p(φ))∪ p(φ)−1,≈pi⟩
2. r(φ) ∶= {⟨w,w′⟩ ∈ rpii ∣ spii ∈ 0[φ]}
3. p(φ) ∶= {⟨w,w′⟩ ∈ ppii ∣ spii ∈ 0[φ]}
Remark 7 The appearance of this definition belies its simplicity. Subtracting⋃alt{spi}(φ) from s recreates the familiar effect of removing the φ -worlds from
s. pi updownharpoonrightleft φ is the result of removing φ -preferences from pi . This is done in clauses
1a and 1b in slightly different ways for requirements and permissions. For re-
quirements, one removes any requirement preferences φ would add to 0 i.e., r(φ).
One has to restore relations of indifference between these worlds, which is what(∼pi ∪ r(φ)∪ r(φ)−1) accomplishes. Additionally, one must add to the requirements
the inverse of any preferences φ would add to 0 i.e., p(φ), and remove relations of
indifference between these worlds. This is needed to ensure that ¬Mayφ ⊫Must¬φ .
Removing preferences from the permissions proceeds similarly in clause 1b, but
does not have the added complexity since ¬Mustφ does not need to p-entail May¬φ .
Remark 8 Why does ¬φ remove preferences φ would add to 0, rather than pref-
erences φ would add to the input state S? When S = 0[MayA] and one considers
S[¬MayA] it is clear that MayA won’t add any preferences to S. Thus negation
wouldn’t have any preferences to remove, and 0[MayA] would counterintuitively
p-support ¬MayA.
Definition 16 (Informational Support, Consequence)
1. S ⊧ φ ⇐⇒ cS = cS[φ], where cS ∶=⋃{s ∣ spi ∈ S}
2. φ1, . . . ,φn ⊧ψ ⇐⇒ ∀S∶ cS[φ1]⋯[φn] ⊧ψ
Definition 17 (Informational Consistency) ∃S∶ S ⊧ φ1, . . . ,S ⊧ φn & cS ≠∅
Definition 18 (Practical Support, Consequence)
1. S⊫ φ ⇐⇒ ∏S =∏S[φ], where ∏S ∶= {pi ∣ spi ∈ S & s ≠∅}
2. φ1, . . . ,φn⊫ψ: ∀S∶ S[φ1]⋯[φn]⊫ψ
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Remark 9 The definition excludes pi’s that feature only in substates with the empty
information state. This allows the logic to validate disjunctive syllogism when one
of the disjuncts is a deontic modal e.g., MayA∨B and ¬B so MayA.
Definition 19 (Practical Consistency)∃S∶ S⊫ φ1, . . . ,S⊫ φn & ⋃{Chs(Rpi) ∣ spi ∈ S} ≠∅
Remark 10 Just as Definition 17 rules out the irrational information state ∅, Defi-
nition 19 rules out practically irrational states, namely ones which do not have at
least one pi that motivates the agents to choose at least one world.
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